Out of existing available deployment on the LAC, India can almost treble the same at key locations. Contingency positions are already prepared to absorb these troops. Reinforced defense posturing would accrue to about 15-18 Mountain divisions approximately deployed on the entire LAC, even after catering for the Pakistan front. Now keeping the differential combat ratios, it would necessitate application of about 85-90 fresh PLA divisions against India for any decisive offensive (HLT) battle in future. However, this ratio can be marginally reduced to about 80 PLA divisions by recycling of troops. Thus in actuality, the Chinese will always fall short by 30-35 divisions for any decisive victory. This simple calculation further goes in India’s favour because India has battle-experienced and acclimatized troops over many years. Therefore, with a sense of guarantee one can vouch that the Indian Himalayan wall created by the Indian Army is impregnable and invincible. This reality appears to have dawned on the Chinese leadership to decide on disengagement, as on 06 July 2020.Moreover, logistics is yet another great hindrance across the Himalayas for sustenance of PLA forces with extended lines of communication through the Himalayas. Because of long lines of maintenance, and the coming winters this season, the Chinese will suffer economic costs and attrition for maintaining such large amount of forces. This will create an unaffordable logistics nightmare for the PLA.This predicament has compelled the PLA, to not only disengage, but also de-escalate to their permanent locations.

To further strengthen the above factors, India should adopt an ‘Offensive –Defensive’ posture. What is important is to task at least one Brigade per reinforcement Division for Local Counter-attack and shallow objectives offensive at two to three points. This will then ensure that we can seize lightly held/unheld areas as a bargaining asset with the Chinese. Urgently we should also create an Adhoc strike corps for the Ladakh areas/Central sector leaving the newly raised truncated 17 Corps for the Arunachal area. We should immediately create this capability and let China know that we have one Strike corps each for the Ladakh and Eastern area. This will create a ‘Conventional Dissuasive Deterrence’ against China and will create a dilemma in their minds.

In addition, we should prepare and upgrade a ready state of Nuclear Weapons. We have to create nuclear thresholds ground lines to apply deterrence. This nuclear posturing is very important. An ambiguous statement will be more beneficial like the Chinese always do, which can translate into a policy of a First Strike at political targets contrary to Chinese strategy of ‘Counter-Force targeting’ which translates to the use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons. This will provide us strategic deterrence and strategic space for negotiations. In addition, at selected areas where PLA may try a breakthrough, we have to prepare to counter chemical/bio-agents by instituting defensive measures to avoid a surprise.

The PLA has formed an Integrated Command against the Indian front In Tibet. China has done restructuring. The earlier PLA deployments were about 5 Divisions plus three reserves of 24 Army Group at Chengdu MR and about 8xDivisions plus 5 division as a reserve of 2 Army Group located earlier at Lanzhou MR. Both have been now merged to form an Integrated command against the Indian front in Tibet. The Tibet Military Command, is under the leadership of the Chinese ground forces, which suggests that the command may undertake some kind of military combat mission in the future.As per Global Times: “This new role and up-gradation of higher rank indicates that this command is gearing up for combat operations in an expanded Tibet region. This further implies that the role of protecting the CPEC up to Gwadar/Karachi will delve on this new upgraded command structure. It also implies that China is creating the capacity to fight an integrated informationalised warfare on the Tibet front. One cannot overlook that China is creating the capacity to expand the Tibet military region into India at both Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh.The answer is that India too needs to reorganize to create an integrated command handling India’s Eastern front. Presently, there are about four different command Headquarters and multiple ministries/elements handling the China front from DBO in Ladakh to Jairampur/Myanmar border in Arunachal Pradesh. What we have to do is to integrate the formations/ paramilitary units to either the Northern Command or the Eastern Command of the army. This will ensure unity and uniformity in command across the LAC especially for the Central sector.

In conclusion, after war-gaming the various realistic scenarios and debating the combat ratios/logistics lag, it is clear that for any high- level offensive, the Chinese are likely to face many constraints. These cannot be waived off. Resultantly, there will be a strategic stalemate. Such hard fought battles always last a long time giving a window to the defender for mustering the world reaction to neutralize China with a bleeding nose as was seen during the Galwan fistfights. Technological advantage, which China claims, may not be true for High Altitude rugged mountains, which inherently give full protection from air and artillery bombardment to the ground soldiers. Therefore, the thought to use diplomacy to enable military disengagement may not stand true. In fact, vice-versa the strength of our military today, gives us enough space for strategic and diplomatic negotiations. There is bound to be complete disengagement very soon. In times to come, this impasse in the Himalayas will facilitate the concept of a pivot in Asia, where the maritime domination by US and allied forces can become the key factor for Asian security and peace.

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Views expressed above are the author's own.

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